Key Concepts & History

The Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation (SEPAD) project based at Lancaster University’s Richardson Institute is a collaborative project aimed at understanding the conditions that give rise to sectarian violence and proxy conflicts along religious lines with the aim of creating space for a ‘de-sectarianisation’ of socio-political life. Formed in 2018 through a generous grant from Carnegie Corporation, it is currently in its second phase.

SEPAD seeks to identify and explore the role of sect-based identities within contemporary life across the Middle East and beyond. In particular, SEPAD is interested in how regional politics impacts on local identities and vice versa. Building on recent debates in academic literature, we view sectarian identities in a constructivist manner and seek to pay attention to the contingencies of time and space in undertaking our analysis. The first phase of the project sought to do two things: 1) to explore the impact of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran on regime-society relations in Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon which had been increasingly strained over the years leading up to – and after – the Arab Uprisings; and 2) understand the ways in which the role of religion in all aspects of life was re-imagined by people and regimes.

In the second phase of SEPAD we seek to apply our initial findings to three new Middle Eastern case studies, Kuwait, Syria and Yemen, and three non-Middle Eastern case studies, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina and India. Much like phase one, the second phase of SEPAD focusses on divided societies, yet with the addition of non-Middle Eastern case studies, we seek to test our initial findings about sectarianism in divided societies in societies a) in a different region and b) divided along different lines.

The concept of sectarianism is one that is regularly used to explain difference and violence within and between states across the Middle East, from the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, to the fragmentation of political life and violence in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Such views seek to reduce events to “ancient hatreds”, removing local context and the political, social and economic forces that shape life in the process. Literally speaking, sectarianism denotes membership of a group possessing a shared identity, belief or ideology that differentiates the group from society. Implicitly theological, such communities are located within broader socio-economic and political dynamics, creating an environment that is shaped by the interaction of a range of different factors from identity to the very nature of belief.

Although we must stress the importance of context in shaping identity and political action, we should be careful not to ignore faith and the history of difference between the different sects of Islam. Predominantly – although not exclusively – referring to differences between Sunni and Shi’a, there is a long and complex history between the two sects, dating back to questions about succession after the death of the Prophet. At this time, difference was political, although in later years it would become imbued with different meaning as context shaped how identities were constructed and interacted with one another.

Whilst sectarianism as a concept denotes a particular thing, it has increasingly become used as a ‘catch all’ concept to refer to all forms of contestation between different groups, regardless of the source of such tension. This type of analysis can have detrimental consequences not only through ignoring legitimate grievances of a social, political or economic nature, but also in helping cultivate a narrative of irreconcilable difference between different groups that plays into ideas of “ancient hatreds”.

On the 17th December 2010, a Tunisian street vendor self-immolated in protest at the widespread repression and marginalization that had restricted his socio-economic and political behaviour. The actions of Mohammad Bouazizzi triggered a wave of protests that spread across the Arab world, from the shores of North Africa to those of the Gulf, whilst expressions of support and solidarity were heard from all parts of the region amidst shared political and economic concerns that had been latent over the past decade. Referred to by a number of different names including the Arab Spring, Arab Awakening, or Arab Revolutions, this project uses Arab Uprisings to avoid any Orientalist associations.

The uprisings challenged the organisation of political life across the Middle East, contesting social contracts and in a number of cases, opening schisms between rulers and ruled that facilitated the fragmentation of state sovereignty. In such conditions, political life became contested as people struggled to voice their concerns and to meet their basic needs. Within such uncertainty, people were forced to look beyond the state to ensure their survival. One strategy was to retreat into local communities such as sects, tribes or ethnicities which were able to provide the means through which people could survive but in doing so, divisions within states were exacerbated, deepening fissures between rulers and ruled.

In response to contestation and fragmentation, political elites sought to ensure their survival by using a range of strategies. From token political reform to violent repression, regimes capitalised of context specific contingency. One common strategy was to exacerbate sectarian divisions as a mechanism of control, dividing protest groups along communitarian lines and attempting to remove legitimate political grievances from public discourse. Instead, events were framed as a consequence of nefarious political activity, typically the result of Shi’a unrest which was incited by pernicious Iranian activity.  In a number of cases, such difference was cultivated to locate events within a broader geopolitical struggle pitting Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states against Iran. 

Across an increasingly networked world, ideas of proxies have taken on rising importance within global politics. In the contemporary Middle East, shared normative environments have created links across state borders, adding regional dimensions to conflicts that often begin within the territorial borders of particular states. The region has long been shaped by power struggles between states vying for influence, previously between competing visions of Arab unity and increasingly within the context of a rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Amidst the fragmentation of political organization and parabolic regional pressures, states, societies and social movements struggle locate themselves within such environments, often turning to powerful allies as a means of securing themselves and supporting their aspirations. 

In recent years, this has increasingly played out along sectarian lines, amidst what Bassel Salloulk has termed “sectarianism as geopolitics by other means”. Across the region, Saudi Arabia has offered support to allies who also seek to counter Iranian gains, whilst Iran has provided support to groups who share its vision. It is here, as groups supported by actors external to the conflict clash that we see the emergence of a proxy conflict.

The concept contains a number of assumptions about power relations and causality, often denying the agency of local actors within a relationship with much more powerful external actors. In Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon, the presence of groups with shared sectarian identities leaves states open to the cultivation of powerful networks that can – and indeed have – manifested in proxy conflicts.

• Bassel F. Salloukh (2013) The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East, The International Spectator, 48:2, 32-46,
• Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013)
• Simon Mabon, ‘Muting the Trumpets of Sabotage’

Broadly speaking, de-sectarianization refers to a re-imagining of the role of religion in political life. Much like sectarianism and sectarianization, the concept of de-sectarianization is also deeply contested amid questions about definitions, processes, aspirations, and actors involved. In SEPAD, we use the concept of de-sectarianization as an umbrella term to refer to the re-imagining of the role of religion in political life. This definition then encompasses a range of other more specific concepts such as post-sectarianism, anti-sectarianism, trans-sectarianism and others. Although typically associated with popular protests, processes of de-sectarianization can also occur amidst efforts from political elites to re-define or re-imagine the role of religion within political projects. For example, this may include the privileging of nationalist or ethnic identities.

For more reflections on this concept see this piece (https://www.sepad.org.uk/announcement/de-sectarianization-some-initial-thoughts ) written by Simon Mabon, this piece by Elias Ghazal (https://www.sepad.org.uk/announcement/desectarianization-in-lebanon-where-to-begin), and this special issue (https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rfia20/18/1?nav=tocList )of The Review of Faith and International Affairs on the topic of de-sectarianization featuring contributions from SEPAD Fellows.

An emerging theme from the first phase of SEPAD, space is central to much of what will follow in phase two. Fundamentally a philosophical concept, space can be understood and applied in a range of different ways. While not deploying a fixed definition of the concept, we define space along the lines proposed by Doreen Massey in For Space, predicated upon three assumptions:

• Space is a product of interactions - in myriad forms - ranging from the ‘intimately tiny’ to the global
• Space is a sphere of possibility, heterogeneity and multiplicity
• Space is not fixed, but rather in a perennial state of construction

In this vein we are better placed to understand the ways in which people shape their environments but also the ways in which environments shape people. For more, see this SEPAD report on sectarianism and urban spaces.