Managing the Political: The Case of Iran
7th Mar 2023 by Simon Mabon
A guest blogpost by Dr Samuel Mace, University of Leeds
Managing politics in the modern day remains a complex task. Polities are made up of diverse groups with differing agendas that are ever changing ensuring institutional management of the political comes under contestation. In liberal democracies the safety valve for managing politics are elections. Elections provide the chance for the citizenry to rotate not just politicians but guiding ideologies, if political elites fail to satisfy the citizenry then they run the risk of losing access to institutional power. However, in authoritarian regimes, even those with a democratic component such as Iran, this safety valve is not available to regimes. The result is an enlarged risk of political turbulence emerging when institutions cannot satisfactorily manage the political.
This is not simply a theoretical claim but something which can be witnessed in practice. The Arab Uprisings demonstrated that even long standing authoritarian regimes can hold a façade of stability without truly exercising it. Some scholars, such as Jason Brownlee (2013), described the Arab Springs as a ‘modest harvest’ due to their inability to produce meaningful regime change. However, this critique ignores the speed at which protests spread and regime inability to resolve them without resorting to coercion. Thus, the focus should not be on the uprisings’ mixed results but rather the conditions that allowed the uprisings to emerge in the first place i.e., authoritarian regimes unable to sufficiently manage the political.
This is not to suggest theorists have not developed approaches where a strong non-liberal democratic state can theoretically manage the political. One of the most famous scholars to attempt this was Carl Schmitt. Schmitt, famous for his legal theories, was also a political theorist who wrote an account of sovereignty challenging the liberal democratic state. This was achieved by questioning the notion of what constituted politics and how to manage political relationships.
Schmitt, a German Jurist, and member of the Nazi Party, believed politics couldn’t be managed by Liberal Democracies, an institutional arrangement he believed to be contradictory. Arguing that liberalism and democracy were inherently in contestation with one another; liberalism, for Schmitt (2005, 2008), is centered upon norms constraining the will of the people via the application of norms, whilst democracy, is founded upon the expression of the people’s will necessarily contesting ideological norms. The result was an inherent tension between the two leading to a dysfunctional state either unable or unwilling to make decisions.
For Schmitt, it was the friend enemy dichotomy that defined politics. It is this dichotomy which is defined by its strength of enmity that defines ‘the political’. From this perspective, political subjects cannot be reasoned about or managed via heterogeneous tolerant relationships as liberalism supposes. As illustrated by the quote below, the enemy is not just disagreement as some imagine but a stronger feeling of the ‘alien’ among us:
“Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the antithesis of friend and enemy corresponds to the relatively independent of other antitheses: good and evil in the moral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on.” (Schmitt 2007 pg. 26).
This strength of feeling is not a normative wish but a descriptive fact for Schmitt. Recognising said enmity is necessary to successfully formulate and manage politics, i.e., if homogeneity is not achieved by acknowledging the friend enemy dichotomy then politics cannot be managed and will break down. This relies upon an assumption that what is ‘the political’ needs to reach such a strong degree of enmity that deliberation cannot solve it. Richard Wolin cites Schmitt arguing this point when he claims.
"Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second - if the occasion arises - elimination or eradication of heterogeneity” (Wolin 1990 pg. 403)
This identification of politics is important to understand given its relationship to Schmitt’s idea of state building. As Reinhard Mehring has highlighted, Schmitt argued in The Concept of the Political that “the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” (Mehring 2017 pg.305). By conceiving of politics in this way and arguing that liberal democracies are ill-equipped to manage such relationships, Schmitt applies an alternative. It is an alternative that has gained influence internationally and politically, according to Libin and Patapan (2020) as liberal democratic norms come under increasing contestation.
Schmitt is not a democrat in the way we practice democracy today. The sovereign possessing strong powers, existing inside the legal order yet able to act outside of it, produces some discomforting notions. A theme in Schmitt’s works, such as The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, emphasise the role of the sovereign at the expense of regular democratic oversight. As the sovereign ‘manages’ the homogenous mass, stripping away heterogeneity, they are also able to override majoritarian wishes. Demonstrated by the quote below, Schmitt takes seriously both the limitations of institutions such as Parliament and majoritarian reasoning.
“Compared to a democracy that is direct, not only in the technical sense but also in a vital sense, parliament appears as an artificial machinery. Produced by liberal reasoning, while dictatorial and Caesaristic methods not only can produce the acclamation of the people but can also be a direct expression of democratic substance and power” (Schmitt 2000 pg. 17).
Perhaps best described by the quote “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Schmitt 2005 pg.1). Schmitt’s solution is a sovereign unconstrained by law to act as necessary to create and maintain homogeneity. Sovereignty is thus imagined as the ability to act as opposed to any normative criteria. By acting as a ‘sovereign god’ i.e., a leader who can intervene at will to make ‘political miracles’ the sovereign can manage ‘the political’ in a way that institutions guided by norms cannot. As written in the quote below it is not the ideal that matters but the concrete outcome.
“Therefore, especially in a Dictatorship, only the goal governs, which is freed from restrictions imposed by the law and is only determined by the need to create a concrete situation. In principle, whenever there is an exclusively technical interest in the state and political matters, legal restriction can be a hinderance and something inappropriate-in exactly the same way.” (Schmitt 2000 pg. 8).
Whilst Schmitt was operating from a European context his ideas about authoritarian sovereignty can be useful when discussing challenges to regimes in the MENA region. As Gause (2011) argued, before the Arab Uprisings arrived, scholars were largely focused on the apparent persistence of undemocratic rulers. This led to broader debates about the ‘exceptional’ nature of the region, apparently immune to the spreading democratic wave that spread across Europe following the fall of the Soviet Union. Some, such as Jason Brownlee (2013), still see the region in this way labelling the Arab Springs as a ‘modest harvest’ i.e., focusing on the continued resilience of authoritarian regimes. Eva Bellin is a good example of a scholar who has written widely on the question of the sustainability of authoritarian regimes in the region even in the face of widespread discontent (Bellin 2012).
However, what this line of investigation ignores is the deeper question of political order. To question the notion of authoritarian sovereignty, it is important to understand where authority originates from and how it is exercised. Authority is not simply a matter of having the ability to make decisions, rather it necessitates a belief in the right to make said decisions. Reflecting on what Raz (2005) has argued, the fluidity of politics authorities does not remain static or immune from political sea changes. This is especially true of personalised systems of government and as Hannah Arendt (1953, 1970, 2007) argued personalised forms of authority are particularly suspect to changing events and suffer from instability.
Given Schmitt’s focus on concrete outcomes it is important to question his hypothesis of homogeneity and order fostering sovereignty. After-all, whilst sovereigns may have the power to declare and act on the exception, that decision is not guaranteed to produce a functional political order. Even if Schmitt’s assumption about the nature of politics is correct, that does not suggest his solution is the right one. A weakening of sovereignty in this regard does not necessitate the fall of a regime but rather the creation of a dysfunctional political order.
Iran makes for a useful case study to analyse these deeper problems of the political order. The Iranian regime is complex, more sophisticated, and less overtly dictatorial than other nations in the region, such as Syria, it nevertheless suffers from challenges to its authority. The Islamic Republic envisioned by Ayatollah Khomeini functioned on both the basis of Islamic Law and the ‘will of the people’. This ‘will of the people’ was articulated via a guardian jurist who commands the armed forces, appoints half of jurists to the Guardian Council, and who appoints the country’s supreme judicial authority. This is supplemented by Republican institutions such as the Majlis and the President who are democratically elected by the populace representing the current will of the people.
However, despite this democratic element and competition, the Guardian Council, an unelected body of experts, have the power to judge which candidates can run, supervises elections, and can veto legislation from the Majlis. Despite this, as Farhi (2008) has argued even with the narrowing of the ideological range of candidates down elections have provided the chance for campaigning, mobilising voters, and engaging in political conversations. Elections and the Republican elements of the constitution it could be argued helps provide public legitimation for the institutions that exist. Despite this, public legitimation for such institutions today is struggling as democratic will is not adequately expressed. Indeed, recently engagement with elections has been low with a turnout of less than 45% for the 2020 Parliamentary elections and 50% for the 2021 Presidential election indicating a lack of satisfaction in the ‘democratic elements’ of Iran’s hybrid system.
Iran’s hybrid system also has an additional element. Khomeini’s constitutional structure argued for the legitimacy of state decrees by the supreme jurist to be used when the Parliament and Guardian Council disagreed, a practice Khamenei has continued. The Schmittian comparisons have not been lost on some, scholars such as Brannstrom have located the question of ‘who decides’ in Schmitt as parallel to this type of rule. The Iranian constitution as such is not merely a set of rules but typifies the Schmittian conception of a ‘constitution’ i.e., a physical social and political order regulating life. That ‘order’ is not one that reflects regular democratic oversight over the jurist, but often descends into authoritarian factionalism as argued by the quotes below.
“The constitution of the Republic, the preamble asserts further, is an articulation of the political, social, cultural, and economic relations and institutions of the society, and is intended to strengthen the foundations of Islamic government. And Article 4 of the constitution, which declares that all laws must be based on the Islamic standards, does explicitly include the constitution itself” (Brannstrom 2022 pg.84)
“The most critical problem raised by the way in which Schmitt/ Khomeini suggest that foundational decisions of a political community are to be made is not about extra-legality, but about authoritarianism and about repressive rule by loyal factions claiming they represent the “real” people.” (Brannstrom 2022 pg. 86)
The result of these arrangements is a democratic deficit in the political order affecting institutional ability to manage politics. Because of this, institutions struggle to foster lasting legitimacy creating the environment for such arrangements to be challenged. Undemocratic institutions in Iran’s hybrid system have conflicted with its democratic element. The Guardian Council according to research from Boroujerdi and Rahimkhani have regularly vetoed around 20% of laws between 1980-2015. Additionally, the constitutional limitations of the Majlis’ legislative freedom as highlighted by Cama and Abdolmohammadi (2015) further confine political action within prescribed constitutional boundaries. Whilst the hybrid nature of the regime ensures elite competition there is little scope for democratic differences to be expressed and felt in policy.
There are many who focus on the Green movement of 2009 and the current mass protests against the regime. However, there have been warnings of this level of dissatisfaction growing before the mass uprisings began. During Khatami’s Presidency in both 1999 and 2003 there were waves of protests violently repressed by the regime. Indeed, as highlighted by Tezcur (2010), even in 2003 respondents to surveys lacked faith in the political system as a whole functioning in tune to democratic demands.
“According to a random sample survey conducted in Tehran in August 2003, more than half of the respondents evaluated the political system as not being responsive to their demands. Forty-five per cent argued that the state had completely failed in achieving the goals deemed important by citizens.”(Tezcur 2010 pg.78).
Thus, the mass protests that emerged in 2009 should have come as little surprise. Following protests in 1999 and 2003, the green movement should be seen as part of a stronger and deeper problem the regime faces i.e., inability to respond to political shifts amongst the citizenry. The Iranian green movement in 2009 represented a groundswell of dissatisfaction amongst a large number of Iranian citizens. Whilst the tipping point was the contested election for President, with Ahmadinejad declared the victor, according to scholars such as Golkar (2011).
“While the movement was launched after the announcement of Ahmadinejad’s election victory, it was rooted in deep dissatisfaction and frustration with the regime that ruled Iran for the previous 30 years.” (Golkar 2011 pg.53).
This is emphasised by the inability of the regime to respond to citizen dissatisfaction emerging that could not be resolved institutionally without the use of violence. The green movement’s existence continued into 2011 rather than disappearing quickly. When the Arab Uprisings spread across the region the Iranian regime faced potential difficulties internally which again resorted to coercion to resist a further uprising. Yet, the protests that the Iranian regime face today tell a similar story to the one’s past.
The spark this time was the death of Mahsa Amini in custody, a young Kurdish woman did not comply with the country’s Islamic dress code. Coming off the back of protests in 2017, 2018, and 2019 over issues such as gas and food prices the regime response was once again one of coercion, such as shutting down the internet and excessive force as well as blaming outside interference. The regime according to the Iranian human rights news agency is responsible for the deaths of “at least 458 people including 63 children have been killed by security forces in the nationwide protests so far. Of the 63 children, nine were girls.” (IHR N.P.) The Iranian regime for their part has admitted to arresting ‘tens of thousands’ but claimed those arrested were involved in ‘foreign backed riots’ (NPR N.P.).
Whilst Iran contains multiple elements in its regime, both democratic and non-democratic, it is struggling to create and maintain a stable political order. The political order expressed in the constitution has not been sufficient to contain political discontent with the regime who represent it. Thus, the constitution and political institutions are struggling to manifestly represent the citizens of the country. What the current political order is providing is the mask of sovereignty via the occupation of offices.
This is not to say there are no supporters of the Iranian regime, there are those who still believe in the political order represented by the constitution. Those who do claim to represent the ‘real Iran’ rather than the protesters themselves and constitute an estimated 10-30% of the citizenry. The Iranian regime, like others in the region, empowers this minority block with incentives for social and economic advancement creating a block of ultra loyal supporters. The regime perhaps can survive by retaining the loyalty of minority blocks but it cannot hope to maintain or create political stability.
The regime, an authoritarian one claiming to represent ‘the people’ is by definition not fulfilling its self-defined purpose. Despite mass protests and severe dissatisfaction with the regime it is apparently unwilling to debate the principles on which it stands. This is not to suggest the regime is a monolith, as former UK ambassador to Iran Robert Macaire has argued.
“you can see some people positioning themselves a bit, and of course, we know that, for example, you know, the Sepāh, the IRGC is not a monolithic institution and there are different factions within it, although those are probably factions that are more to do with patronage networks than they are competing visions for the future of the Islamic Republic.” (Chatham House 2022 N.P.)
But this debate inside the regime is not thought to be about the offering of substantial reform but the amount of pressure that should be applied to protesters. Indeed, the ability of the regime to reform itself internally has been stymied making any substantive change via a political settlement look unlikely. Some, such as Hussein Ibish, have argued that perhaps the regime will look to do a deal with the JCPOA to reduce sanctions softening the economic hardship which many currently face. However, without substantive political change beyond the economic, the regime in Tehran will continue to face protests representing a violent political order devoid of substantive legitimacy.